Why KIIT comes under purview of RTI Act
1. Introduction
Kalinga Institute of Industrial Technology (KIIT) is a famous private Institution/ organization spread over more 120 acres of Govt. land which has been leased out by Government of Odisha within period of 15 years. Though the Government has leased out land to this organization, it has also encroached huge land and acquired the Government land through fraudulent means as per CAG Audit report-2013. Besides that it has taken a lot of monetary benefits from the Government to run the institution in terms of obtaining NOC from IDCO to get loan from nationalized banks, Govt. projects, infrastructure development, MPLAD and MLALAD fund etc. With Govt. land and monetary support, this organization has developed huge infrastructure and multiple educational institutions for business purpose. As claimed by Sri Achyut Samant, founder of KIIT, the KIIT deemed University , Kalinga Institute of Medical sciences (KIMS) are the institutions of national repute rendering public service in the state of Odisha.
2. Applicability of RTI for KIIT- A long fight
In 2014, CAG Audit Report on Allotment of land by GA Department, IDCO, BDA was placed in the Odisha assembly. It exposed huge irregularities and illegalities in allotment of land in Bhubaneswar and favoritism shown to some people and land acquired by KIIT through fraudulent means. Prior to this report, RTI Activists in Odisha has brought to limelight huge land allotted to KIIT and KISS ( Kalinga Institute of Social Sciences ) in Bhubaneswar run by Achyut Samant.
To understand functioning of KIIT organization , multiple RTI Applications were filed by many RTI Activists in the office of KIIT, Patia, Bhubaneswar seeking information about relatives of Govt. officers and employees working in KIIT , retired officers and employees appointed in KIIT , various Govt. support mobilized by KIIT to run the institution etc. The PIO of the KIIT denied to supply the information on the ground that it is not the state within the scope of Article 12 of the Indian Constitution. So it does not come under RTI Act.
The Appellant of this case (Pradip Pradhan, RTI Activist, Bhubaneswar) had filed RTI Application dt. 1.9.2014 to the PIO, office of KIIT seeking the information about retired Govt. employees working in KIIT. Ms. Smita Mohanty, Senior PIO rejected RTI Application vide Form-C dt. 29.9.14 by stating that “ Kalinga Institute of Industrial Technology is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and a self-financed private deemed university. KIIT is not a state or authority under Article 12 of the Indian Constitution. Then, the First appeal dt. 7.10.14 was filed before FAA of KIIT, Bhubaneswar. On rejection of first appeal, Second Appeal was filed in the office of Odisha Information Commission alleging that “ the PIO erred in rejecting his application by referring article 12 of the constitution which was not relevant in this context. Further, as per definition of “ Public Authority” provided under section 2(h) of the RTI Act, the same includes “ any Non-Government Organization , substantially financed , directly or indirectly funds provided y the appropriate Government. As KIIT was being directly or indirectly funded by the appropriate Government , it would have to be deemed as a public authority under section 2(h)(d) (ii) of the RTI Act.
3. Hearing in Odisha Information Commission
The Second Appeal case was registered as SA No. 228/2015 and Sri Sunil Kumar Mishra, State Chief Information Commissioner started initial hearing from 15.2.2017 and ended on 5th August, 2021. Within period of 5 years, the Commission conducted around 20 hearings seeking from both parties their submissions and counter –submissions whether KIIT would come under ambit of definition of Public Authority as per section 2(h)(d)(ii) of the RTI Act.
4. Argument of Authority of KIIT
Shri Rabindra Nath Das, Secretary, KIIT submitted that KIIT was not a Public Authority as per definition given in section 2(h) of the RTI Act as it had not been established or constituted ( a) by or under the constitution, (b) by any other law made in parliament, or (c ) by any other law made by the state legislature. It was also neither established nor constituted by any notification issued or order made by the appropriate Government , nor substantially financed by funds provided by the appropriate Government. On the contrary, KIIT was a society of private persons registered under Societies Registration Act. And set up with the objectives of establishing and running educational institutions. The Union Government in the Ministry of Human Resource Development in exercise of power conferred under section 3 of the U.G.C. Act, 1956 declared KIIT vide notification dated 16.2.2004 as a “Deemed to be University” for the purpose of UGC Act. He also referred Karnataka High Court Judgement dated 30.11.2015 in WP Case No. 25114 of 2009 dealt with the question whether or not the RTI Act would be applicable to the Manipal deemed University. The Court observed that “ it would have to be accepted that the petitioner is a “Deemed to be University” and recognized as such under the U.G.C. Act . However, unlike a regular University established under a statute i.e., either under Central Government or State Government Act. It could not be confused with any other university. It was further held by the hon’ble court that the petitioner University was neither controlled nor financed by the State Government and it was certainly a private institution with its own management and control and there fore same could not be brought under the purview of RTI Act.” The Secretary, KIIT argued that In the light of this judgment, KIIT as deemed to be University should not come under RTI Act .
The Appellant ( Pradip Pradhan) submitted plethora of documents obtained under RTI from various public authorities about details of support in terms of land leased out to KIIT , KIMS , Financial support obtained for infrastructure development , projects etc. to justify how KIIT is substantially financed. The offices from which information received under RTI is as follows.
A. Dept. of General Administration , Govt. of India ( valuation Cost of land )
B. IDCO, Bhubaneswar ( Land leased out to KIIT )
C. Ministry of Tribal affairs , New Delhi ( Land records )
D. Ministry of Human Resource Development, New Delhi
E. Ministry of Science and technology, New Delhi ( Project sanctioned to KIIT )
F. Ministry of Home Affairs , Govt. of India ( about FCRA Fund received by KIIT )
G. University Grants Commission, New Delhi ( Land records submitted by KIIT to get deemed University Status)
H. Department of Forest and Environment, Govt. of Odisha ( Forest Land acquired by KIIT and applied for diversion)
I. Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar ( Land acquired by KIIT)
J. BDA, Bhubaneswar ( Permission granted for developing buildings on KIIT Land )
K. Dept. of Panchayat Raj, Government. of Odisha
L. Department of SC and ST Development, Govt. of Odisha ( Student stipend )
M. Dept. of School and Mass Education, Govt. of Odisha
N. CAG Report (General and Social sector volume- 2) produced in 2013 concerning to quantity of land leased out to KIIT at concessional rate and loss of revenue to Govt. due to favoritism shown to KIIT ).
O. Office of District Sub-Registrar, Bhubaneswar ( DSR value of land )
P. Audit Reports of KIIT
Q. Reply of Minister in Assembly on land acquired by KIIT on question raised by Sri Krustan Sagaria, MLA on dt. 22.3.2016.
R. Reply of Minister for Trial Affairs , Government of India about details of fund released to KISS on unstarred question raised by Sri Saptagiri Ulka, MP, Lok Sabha in Parliament on 18.11.2019.
S. Reference of Judgement of Odisha High Court in WPC No. 17171/2011( Dr. Uttam Kumar Samanta vs Kiit University And Others) passed on 29 September, 2014.
5. Hearing, Inquiry, verification and analysis of Data by Chief Information Commission.
A. Initially , it was observed by the Commission that response to the RTI Application submitted on 1.9.2014 was given by Ms. Smita Mohanty , a senior Public Information officer of KIIT University. Although there is no such designation as senior PIO in the Act, , the reply indicated that KIIT is consciously treated as Public Authority by their administration. Accordingly, the senior PIO rejected RTI Application sending Form-C ( intimation of rejection) dt. 29.4.2014 stating that if the applicant is aggrieved , he could file first appeal before First Appellate Authority of KIIT university with 30 days. The Commission observed that this response of PIO indicated that KIIT is a Public Authority and the PIO has acted accordingly complying provisions of RTI Act.
B. On 29.4.21, the senior PIO of KIIT rejected RTI Application on the ground that “ KIIT is not the state or authority under article 12 of the Constitution of India”. Concededly, on same day the Hon’ ble Odisha High Court decided the Writ Petition in WP( C) 171/2011 in the case of Dr. Uttam Kumar Samanta VS KIIT University and held that KIIT being creature of statute and also discharging a public duty came well within the meaning of “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The ground adopted by the PIO of KIIT for rejecting appellant’s application for information had been negated by the Hon’ble High Court on the very date of rejection of RTI Application. The Hon’ble High Court also observed that KIIT University appeared to have brought itself under the fold of the Right to Information Act , 2005 and Odisha RTI Rules, 2006.
C. Section 2(h) of the RTI Act has defined the Public Authority which is a follows.
“ Public Authority” means any authority or body or institution of self-government established or constituted;
(a) by or under the Constitution
(b) by any other law made by the Parliament
(c) by any other law made by the State Legislature;
(d) by notification issued or order made by the appropriate Government and
includes any-
(i)body owned, controlled or substantially financed ;
(ii) Non-Government Organisation substantially financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government.
D. In the context of question whether KIIT is an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution of India , the Commission has referred the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty vrs International Airport Authority of India , AIR 1979 SC 1628 in which the determining factors of a state or an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution of India were laid down as under-
a. If the share capital of the corporation is held by the Government , it would go on to indicate the Corporation as an instrumentality or agency of the Government.
b. Assistance from the State in order to meet the financial expenditure of the Corporation is an indication of the corporation being impregnated with a Government character.
c. The monopoly status must either be state conferred or state protected.
d. The State must have a deep and pervasive control over the affairs.
e. The functions of the entity must be of public importance.
f. A separate Department of the Government must be transferred to the Corporation.
The Commission has further elaborated that the function of the entity being of public importance is one of the tests laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Commission has referred “ Public Functions Doctrine” in Black’s Law Dictionary. It is stated that Private Persons’ actions constitute state action if the private persons perform function that are traditionally reserved for the state. “ Government- Function theory “ or “ Public Function Rationale” have been referred to as the principle by which private conduct is characterized as State Action, especially for due process and equal protection purpose, when a private party is exercising private function.
E. The Commission has also made reference of decision of High Court, Odisha ( this order of High Court was presented before Commission during course of hearing ) in the case of Uttam Kumar Samanta vrs KIIT University and others. The High Court held that the KIIT University as a State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India in view of the fact that being a Deemed University , the University was the creature of the statute and it was also performing public duty.
F. The argument “that as because KIIT deemed University is the State within meaning of the Article 12 of the Constitution of India , it should come under purview of definition of public Authority under RTI Act” does not hold same thing as establishing or constituting a body or institution under constitution or by or under any law of the Legislature as per section 2(h) of the RTI Act. The Supreme Court held in the Thalappam case “We can….. draw a clear distinction between a body which is created by a statute and a body which after having coming into existence is governed in accordance with the provision of a statute.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed it in the context of the Kerala Cooperative Society Act. The Court held that the concerned societies which are governed by the societies Act are not statutory bodies but only body corporates within the meaning of section 9 of the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act. In the light of this judgment, deemed University status of KIIT does not by itself make it into a public authority within the meaning of Clause (d) of Section 2(h) of the RTI Act.
G. Then, the Commission has examined whether KIIT will come under section 2(h)(d)
(i) Body owned , controlled or substantially financed;
(ii) Non-Government Organization substantially financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government.
While defining three words “owned” , “controlled” or “substantially financed”, the Commission has completely relied on decision of Supreme Court in the case of Thalappalam vrs State of Kerala reported in 2013 (11) CLR (SC)881. The Court has held that
“ We are of the opinion that when we test the meaning of expression “ controlled which figures in between the words “ body owned” and substantially financed” , the control by the appropriate Government must be a control of substantial nature. The mere “supervision” or “regulation” as such by a statute or otherwise of a body would not make that body a “ public authority” with the meaning of Section 2(h)(d)(i) of the RTI Act. In other words, just like a body owned or body substantially financed by the appropriate Government, the control of the body by the appropriate Government would also be substantial and not merely supervisory or regulatory. The power exercised by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies and others under the Cooperative Societies Act are only regulatory and supervisory in nature , which will not amount to dominating or interfering with the management or affairs of the society so as to be controlled. The management and control are statutorily conferred on the management Committee or the board of Directors of the society by the respective Cooperative Societies Act and not on the authorities under the Cooperative Societies Act. We are , therefore of the view that the word “ controlled” used in section 2(h)(d)(i) of the Act has to be understood in the context in which it has been used vis-a-vis a body owned or substantially financed by the appropriate Government, that is, the control of the body is such a degree which amounts to substantial control over the management and affairs of the body.”
In view of this judgment, the commission considered that KIIT cannot be treated as public authority under section 2(h)(d)(i) of the RTI Act.
H. Then, the Commission finally examined whether KIIT would come under section 2(h)(d)(ii) of the RTI Act. This section exclusively relates to “non-Government Organisations substantially financed, directly or indirectly, by funds provided by appropriate government”. While finding out meaning of “substantially financed”, the Commission has taken clue from Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Edn.) and Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5th Edn.). In the Black’s Law Dictionary, the word “substantially” has been defined as ‘of real worth and importance; of considerable value; valuable. Belonging to substance; actually existing; real : not seeming or imaginary; not illusive ; solid; true; veritable. Something worthwhile as distinguished from something without value or merely nominal. Synonymous with material. In the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the word ‘ substantial’ has been defined to mean “of ample or considerable amount of size; sizeable, fairly large; having solid worth or value, of real significance; solid; weighty; important, worthwhile; of an act, measure etc. having force or effect , effective , thorough.
The Commission has also made reference of few judgements of the courts to bring more clarity on ‘ substantial funding’. The Hon’ ble Punjab and Harayana High Court in the case of Hindu Urban Cooperative bank Ltd. 2011 observed that -
‘Taken in the context of larger public interest, the funds which the Government deal with are public funds. They belong to the people. In that eventuality, wherever public funds are provided, the word ‘substantially financed’ can not possibly interpreted in narrow and limited terms of mathematical calculation and percentage (%). Wherever public funds are provided, the word ‘substantial’ has to be construed in contradistinction to the word ‘trivial’ and where the funding is not trivial to be ignored as pittance, then to me , the same would amount to substantial funding coming from the public funds. Therefore, whatever benefit flows to the petitioner-institutions in the form of share capital contribution or subsidy, land or any other direct or indirect funding from different fiscal provisions for fee , duty, tax etc. as depicted hereinabove would amount to substantial finance by the funds provided directly or indirectly by the appropriate Government.”
In the case of the Registrar, Thiagarajar College of Engineering (2013), the Hon’ble Madras
High Court did not attach much of significance to the quantum of funds. Instead, the Hon’ble High Court attached more significance to the nature of functions performed by the organization. If the functions are public and if organization is receiving government grants, the High Court held that these should suffice to consider the body or organization as public authority. The relevant part of the judgment is presented below.
“ once public money is paid to the college for the purpose of imparting education and when public policies towards implementation of achieving social justice is sought to be enforced in any educational institution, by the state , then it is incumbent on the educational authorities to implement the same, and that no college can be permitted to take a defense that it does not come within the purview of the Act, and that the Public Information Officer can not issue any direction to the college to disclose any information to the applicant. Such a stand would defeat the very purpose and object of the RTI Act.” Xxxx The Court is of the view that the quantum of grant does not always decide applicability of the provisions of the RTI Act, to an educational institution or any other body established or constituted as defined under section 2(h) of the RTI Act , but it should be referable to the activity carried on by such entities , involving public interest and public duty which includes an educational institution.”
The Commission has also referred that the Hon’ble Orissa High Court in the case of North East Electricity Supply Company of Odisha , 2009 linked Public authority with public function. In the case of Thalappalam Service Cooperative bank and others vs Director of Public Instructions & Others, the Supreme Court observed that
“The word ‘substantial’ is not synonymous with ‘dominant’ or ‘majority’. It is closer to ‘material’ or ‘important’ or ‘of considerable value’. ‘Substantially’ is closer to ‘Essentially’. Both words can signify varying degree depending on the context”.
“Merely providing subsidies, grants , exemptions , privileges etc. as such, cannot be said to be providing funding to a substantial extent, unless the record shows that the funding is so substantial to the body which practically runs by such funding and but for such funding, it would struggle to exist. The state may also float many schemes generally for the betterment and welfare of the cooperative sector like deposit guarantee scheme, scheme of assistance from NABARD etc. but those facilities or assistance cannot be termed as ‘ substantially financed’ by the state government to bring the body within the fold of ‘public authority” under section 29h)(d)(i) of the RTI Act. But there are instances, where private educational institutions getting ninety-five per cent grant –in-aid from the appropriate Government , may answer definition of public authority under section 2(h)(d)(i) of the RTI Act.”
In the DAV college Trust Case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court elucidated the term “substantial financed’ as under;
In our view, “substantial funding” means a large portion. It does not necessarily have to mean a major portion or more than 50%. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard. Substantial financing can be both direct and indirect. To give an example, if a land in a city is given free of cost or on heavy discount to hospitals, educational institutions or such other body, this in itself could also be substantial financing. The very establishment of such an institution, if it is dependent on the largesse of the state in getting land at a cheap price, would mean that it is substantially financed. Merely because financial contribution of the state comes down during the actual funding, will not by itself mean that the indirect finance given is not to be taken into consideration. The value of the land will have to be evaluated not only on the date of allotment but even on the date when the question arises as to whether the said body or NGO is substantially financed.
Whether an NGO or body is substantially financed by the government is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case. There may be cases where the finance is more than 50% but still may not be called substantially financed. Supposing a small NGO which has a total capital of Rs. 10,000/- get a grant of Rs. 5000/- cannot be termed as substantial contribution. On the other hand , if a body or an NGO gets hundreds of crores of rupees as grant but that amount is less than 50%, the same can still be termed to be substantially funding.
I. From these two judgements of the Supreme Court , the Commission finds that mere grants or exemptions or privileges as such would not amount to substantial funding. Even majority funding would not mean substantial funding. In order that the funding can be considered as substantial, the same ought to have a bearing on the existence of the non-Government organisations. If an organisation could not have been set up but for support from the appropriate Government or but for the discounts / subsidies received from the appropriate Government; and, conversely, if withdrawal of the support would adversely affect the existence or running of the organisation, the expression ―substantially financed‖ would be applicable irrespective of the amounts. It is the nature and quality of the funding rather than its quantity, and the possible consequence of non-funding which are more relevant than the amounts per se.The judgement of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the DAV College Trust case is significant because it has widened the scope of ‗substantial financing‘ in order to include such assistances as allotment of land free of cost or at heavy discount. The Hon‘ble Court held that if the entity depended on the largesse of the State in getting land at cheap price, it will be treated as substantially financed by the State, irrespective of the extent of actual financing or contribution. In fact, the Hon‘ble Court went on to hold that in order to find whether land was given at cheap price or heavy discount, even the value of land on the date when the question arises whether the body or NGO is substantially financed will also have to be evaluated.
J. In the light of the above-mentioned Supreme Court Judgement on DAV College Trust, the Commission takes “largesee factor” as key determining factor for consideration whether KIIT would come under RTI Act. The Commission made thorough analysis of the data/ information provided by the appellant in the course of hearings about details of benefits in terms of land and financial support received by KIIT from Government. During course of hearing, it was argued by the Appellant that KIIT i.e., respondent Institution has got huge extents of land from the Government, through leases or otherwise, and at subsidised rates; and that if the lease arrangements are withdrawn, the institution would struggle to exist. In this case, the appellant has referred to Government land including forest land encroached upon by KIIT, subsequent regularization of such encroached and unauthorisedlyused land by the Government; land taken on lease from the Government indirectly i.e. on the Government agreeing to mutual transfers of the land which had been leased out earlier to other private entities; availing of such land, whether directly or indirectly (through mutual transfer) at less than market rates and many times on soft-loan arrangements; KIIT using such lease-hold land for getting finance / loans from banks and others etc. The appellant has also drawn attention of the Commission that KIIT got such huge extent of land at cheap and throwaway prices referring to certain objections raised and observations made by Audit which find place in the C&AG Report, and to the present market values of these land which are phenomenally higher. The appellant has further submitted a few documents in support of the present bench mark-values of land and has argued that the judgement of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the DAV College Trust case would squarely apply. Apart from referring to land used through the encroachment mode or land taken on lease, the appellant has also pointed out several grants and financial assistances which KIIT received from the Governments or their agencies from time to time; the other subsidies, scholarships etc. which were obtained under RTI from the appropriate Government in some years and to the Income-tax exemptions availed by the said institution year after year.
K. The Commission first analysed the issue of encroachment of 18.100 acres of forest land by KIIT which were submitted y the Appellant. The Hon‘ble Minister of Forest & Environment, in the reply given by him to an Unstarred Question raised in the Assembly, confirmed the fact of encroachment of land by KIIT. Some of the notes in the files have been adverted to. It is noted from the said notes that the KIIT had encroached upon some other Government land as well and had also constructed multi-storeyed building thereon for class-room purposes etc. before approaching the Government with request for regularization. It is also seen from the notes that some such requests were decided favourably. The appellant has referred to an Audit objection in the matter of encroachment of land. The Audit observed that under the OPLE Act, such encroached land being surplus forest land was meant for distribution amongst the landless. Audit considered regularization of such land as irregular. Be that as it may, the appellant‘s contention regarding encroachment of Government land is found to be correct. The appellant has also acquired 120.708 acres of Government land. The same includes 11.538 acres on which multistoreyed buildings have been constructed, 18 acres of forest land unauthorisedly occupied and 91.07 acres of land given on lease by IDCO in the Patia and Patharagadia Mouza and in the Chandaka Industrial area which has not been objected by KIIT. The Commission has taken view that it is not the authority to adjudicate on the issue of encroachment or on occupation of land without approval. The Commission no doubt cannot make any such adjudication. However, the fact remains that the extent of Government land as pointed out by the appellant has not been proved to be wrong. As per the appellant, the above extent of 120.708 acres is more than 90% of the total land since the other private plots purchased by KIIT and KISS are 11.304 acres only. The authority of KIIT has not come out with any direct denial of the above claim of the appellant either. It has been merely stated that the appellant should separately say how much private land was purchased by KIIT and KISS respectively. In other words, the appellant‘s contention that KIIT has built its institutions largely on Government land stands confirmed. Even IDCO has confirmed that it gave lease of land to the extent of 90.170 acres (91.170 acres – 1.00 acre given to KIIS) to KIIT. The appellant‘s further argument is that these land have been availed on lease at throw-away prices / subsidised rates. In this connection, the appellant has submitted several documents obtained by him from the concerned authorities through the RTI route. The Commission finds that a few of these documents show that some of the land were given at subsidised rates. There is an admission to this effect in the affidavit filed by the Principal Secretary in the matter of allotment of land to Hospitals including KIMS under KIIT. The land allotted to KIIT was shown as 26.976 acres. It also emerges from the filenotings that some of the land had been earlier given by IDCO at concessional rate of Rs.18.00 lakh per acre. When KIIT sought permission of the Medical Council of India to construct a 700 bedded Hospital, it came to know that the lease period of the land should be 99 years and not 75 years as per the agreement with IDCO. Hence KIIT approached the G.A. & P.G. Department to get the above land back from IDCO and then to re-lease the same to it. The re-leasing no doubt required payment of differential cost. But seen in the light of the affidavit made by the Principal Secretary, the rate would still remain highly subsidised even after such payment. Therefore, the contention of the appellant in this regard is not without merit. The appellant has referred to the alleged undue benefits shown by the appropriate Government to the respondent in the matter of allotment of land resulting in huge revenue loss. In this connection, he has referred to the report of the C&AG of India on General & Social Sector, Volumes-II & III for the year 2012. In Volume-II, the C&AG computed loss of premium of Rs.33.70 crore on account of charging of lower premium as against DSR premium in respect of 26.970 acres of land. The C&AG also pointed out short realization of Rs.66.24 crore by IDCO on account of land given to KIIT. Rightly as pointed out by the respondent, this Commission has no competence to make any observation on the allegations of undue favour etc. However, this Commission also cannot overlook the material which is available on record, i.e. the reports of the C&AG. The respondent has contended that the inference drawn by the C&AG may not be a fact. Further, as per the respondent, it is not known whether or not the State Government has taken any action on the basis of the above report. But the fact remains that a public authority has raised certain objections which would hold good until and unless the objections are withdrawn. Therefore, the Commission takes the objections raised by Audit to construe that the respondent has availed liberal lease arrangements. The more significant documents which the appellant has submitted in support of his contention that land have been given to the respondent, i.e. KIIT, at throw-away prices are the bench-mark values of such land at the time when the appellant asked for the information or at a still later point of time. The appellant has submitted an order dated 28.08.2017 of the G.A. & P.G. Department as per which the bench-mark values / market values of the land in the Chandrasekharpur area were shown as Residential: Rs.800.00 lakh; Commercial: Rs.1250.00 lakh, Agricultural: Rs.600.00 lakh, Potential to be Residential: Rs.800.00 lakh and Industrial: Rs.1150.00 lakh. The corresponding figures in Patia were Rs.1000.00 lakh, Rs.1200.00 lakh, Rs.400.00 lakh, Rs.900.00 lakh and Rs.900.00 lakh respectively. The bench-mark values thus fixed by the Government with retrospective effect from 2014 are supported by an order which is a fact on record and the correctness of the same has not been denied. As already noted, the appellant has also submitted a certificate dated 14.07.021 issued by the DSR, Bhubaneswar in which the value of Plot No.320/3370 (Industrial) was shown as Rs.13.80 crore per acre on the said date as against Rs.12.00 crore per acre as on 31.12.2016. The values thus fixed are significantly higher than the values of Rs.18.00 lakh per acre, Rs.22.00 lakh per acre and Rs.25.00 lakh per acre at which the appellant got land on lease from IDCO from time to time. The respondent‘s argument is that it had taken land on lease much earlier than the dates to which the bench-mark values referred to by the appellant relate. In fact, identical arguments had been raised with reference to the values of IDCO land as per the information received by another applicant, namely, Shri Srikanta Kumar Pakal, from the APIO of IDCO. The further argument of the respondent as 76 per its latest submission is that the latest values submitted by the appellant are in respect of private land and not Government land. The private land are also tiny plots with minimal areas. Coming to the first argument that the values relied upon by the appellant do not relate to the dates on which the respondent had taken land on lease, it would be pertinent to again refer to the observation made by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the D.A.V. College Trust case that even the value of the land at the time when the question arises whether the body or NGO is substantially financed or not will have to be evaluated. Therefore, the reference made and reliance placed by the appellant on the subsequent bench-mark values cannot be disregarded. As regards the argument that the plots / land to which the values cited by the appellant relate are private land and not Government land, the Commission cannot appreciate how values of private land, irrespective of the size, can be ignored particularly as such values are representative of market values unless proved to the contrary. Similarly, as regards size of plots, it is difficult to see how there can be any significant variation between the values of small plots and large plots. Therefore, the above argument cannot be considered as germane to the issue. In view of the observations made hereinabove, and particularly in view of the observation of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the D.A.V. College Trust case referred to supra, the references made by the appellant to the subsequent values of land merit consideration. On such consideration, and on evaluation on the basis thereof, it cannot be gain-said that the respondent has got land on lease from the appropriate Government at very cheap rates. Therefore, even if the appellant‘s allegation of undue favour is not considered as the Government‘s response thereto or action taken thereon are not known, the Commission has nonetheless to hold that the respondent institution got land from the appropriate Government at extremely cheap rates having significant financial implications in its own favour. This has to be treated as indirect substantial financing. The respondent‘s contention is that land were taken from the Government at IDCO prices. The above contention has not been found to be incorrect. However, it has been already noted that the IDCO price itself is a concessional price. In fact, the IDCO prices are even less than the G.A. prices as seen from the information regarding bench-mark values provided by the respective PIOs. Even the respondent in its latest submission has admitted that ―the State Government gave land to IDCO.......... in subsidised rates to boost industries. Thus, by the appellant‘s own admission, the values at which it had got land on lease from IDCO were subsidised / concessional. Therefore, it has to be held that the respondent institution got greatly benefitted by getting large tracts of land on lease from the appropriate Government. Moreover, in view of the discussion in the preceding para relating to the subsequent bench-values of the land in question, the extent of concession which the respondent institution had got at the time of the leases has paled into insignificance. Reference has been made to secondary leasings as well. The appellant got several patches of land on the basis of mutual transfers. These land had been earlier leased out by IDCO to same private industries. IDCO had done the leasings in pursuance of its avowed policy of promoting industrial infrastructure. IDCO‘s agreement with the suggested mutual transfers resulted in great benefit to KIIT which was assured of contiguity of the land thereby immensely facilitating its operations. The fact that even the value of these land have soared significantly in due course need not be over-emphasised. The appellant has referred to several letters which KIIT and its Founder wrote to the Government and Government Agencies with fervent prayer for allotment of land for institutional purposes, for setting up Hospital etc. The requests thus made were in respect of forest land under encroachment, land under unauthorized occupation and other land including the proposed mutual transfers. The significant feature standing out from the various proposals / requests made by the KIIT to the Government and its agencies is that all these were adjoining plots. Overall, they combined to be an asset spread over a large area. Such large areas marked by contiguity cannot be easily had from individuals or private sellers / lessors. Non-availability is an important factor. Even otherwise, the buyers / lessees will have to undergo the rigours of approaching several individuals and private entities and of making acquisitions from numerous sellers and lessors through multiple separate negotiations and deals. These processes by themselves lead to sky-rocketing of prices because of the demands which they trigger and also because of anticipation of growth of the area which the acquisitions stoke. Getting large tracts / areas from the Government spares the buyers / lessees of such rigours. There is also definite financial saving vis-a-vis cost of land and expenses incidental to the transactions. Savings in terms of expenses are in the nature of intangible gains which often remain uncomputed. Getting large number of contiguous plots from the Government at the approved rates, particularly for large projects, results in a still bigger intangible gain. We may imagine a project coming up in bits and pieces and at several places, distant from one another. We may also imagine the operational costs involved in such cases. Not having to incur such additional costs over the duration of the lease is undoubtedly of immense benefit with great financial implications in favour of the buyers / lessees. Such benefits / implications are seldom considered, let alone computed. The benefits, both direct and indirect as well as tangible and intangible, would be still much more if the assets are located at prize destinations such as a commercial hub or a city, more so a capital city. In the present case, KIIT gained immensely by getting contiguous plots of land on lease from the Government in a prize destination such as the capital city of Bhubaneswar, that too at very cheap prices.
L. The appellant has raised another issue of KIIT being gained over out of leasing lands by mortgaging to banks after getting “No Objection Certificate” from IDCO i.e., lessor. Had not IDCO issued “No Objection Certificates” , KIIT would not have been able to avail substantial amounts of loans from Banks. The Commission has considered the submissions thus made by the appellant. Records have also been perused. The Annual accounts for the financial years 2013-14, 2014-15 and 2015-16 which have been submitted by KIIT show that the institution had taken term loans and O/D loans of Rs.467.02 crore, Rs.497.37 crore and Rs.541.96 crore respectively during these three years from several scheduled Banks and a few other private parties. The loans from the private parties were less than Re.1.00 crore each year. Thus almost the entire loans had been taken from the Scheduled Banks on the basis of primary securities and collateral securities. It has been clarified in the ―notes forming part of the Annual accounts‖ that these loans had been availed mainly on the basis of primary and collateral securities, being land, buildings and equipment of the society. The Commission has also noted from the information received by the appellant from IDCO under the RTI Act that IDCO had given consent for availing loans on the basis of mortgage of its land leased out to KIIT. The extent of land given by IDCO on lease has been already noted. Of course, IDCO could furnish details of loans availed by the KIIT on the basis of mortgage of its land only in one instance. But the very fact that consent had been given by IDCO in respect of the land, and in the Annual reports it has been stated that loans were availed from the scheduled Banks by offering land, amongst others, as security, it can be inferred that the KIIT could get substantial amount of loans from Banks by offering the leasehold land as security. During hearing, the representative of KIIT contended that there is nothing wrong on the part of an organization in taking loan from any Bank by mortgaging its own land. However, the respondent has not specifically rebutted the appellant‘s submission that it could get substantial amount of loans from the Banks by offering the Government land taken on lease as security. Hence the Commission held that the land leased out by IDCO greatly helped KIIT in arranging substantial amounts of finances.
M. Then, the Commission examined details of indirect as well as direct finances from the Government and the Government agencies referred by appellant during course of hearing. In this connection, the appellant has invited attention to the respondent‘s accounts for the year ended 31.03.2009. The appellant has also referred to Post-Matric scholarships given by the State Government to the tribal students of KIIT during the years 2012 to 2017; donations, grants and subsidies received from various Government Departments during the years 2005-2010, foreign funds received by the respondent etc. First coming to the Annual accounts for the year ended 31.03.2009, the appellant has claimed that the unsecured loans and other income of the respondent included public money. Similarly, students’ fees were nothing but public money. The Commission does not find merit in the above contention of the appellant. Public money is the public fund given by the public authorities or Government or its agencies either directly or indirectly. Individual persons advancing loans or paying fees cannot be regarded as public fund.
N. As regards the foreign funding stated to have received by KIIT during the year- ended 31.03.2019, the Commission observed that even such funding cannot be treated as having any ingredient of public fund or public money unless it is shown that such foreign funding was done at the instance and promise of the Government or its agencies. Nothing of that sort has been let in by the appellant. Now coming to the scholarships given by the Government to the tribal students of KIIT in certain years, the appellant has contended that such scholarship amounts are part of funding by the Government. The Commission did not accept the above contention. The scholarships are specifically earmarked for the concerned students who alone can receive the same. The institution where the concerned students study only acts as the medium. The institution cannot exercise any liberty with the amounts routed through it. When the institution has no such liberty and cannot use the amounts in any manner other than for which the same have been earmarked or intended, distribution of the scholarship amounts cannot be taken as part of funding of the institution. Hence the appellant‘s argument on this score is rejected by the Commission.
O. The Commission analysed details of the grants and subsidies received from the various Departments and other Government agencies such as DBT, DST, ICMR, CSIR, ICAR, AICTE, DAE, UGC, ORMAS etc. As per the documents submitted by the appellant, KIIT had got Rs.6.13 crore (Rs.2.24 + Rs.3.89) towards such grants and subsidies during the period 2005-10 and Rs. 2.42 crore during the period 2010-17. It had also received Rs.21.12 crore from ORMAS under the DDU-GKY Scheme. The argument of the appellant is that these grants amount to Government financing of the respondent society. The respondent Institution on the other hand contended that the 82 research grants received were for earmarked projects undertaken by the Faculty Members and also received because of efforts made by the Faculty Members. The Commission has considered the above submission of the respondent. The Commission has also noted from the Annual accounts for the years-ended 31.03.2013, 31.03.2014 and 31.03.2015 that the various Departments had provided grants etc. for specified projects. It has to be inferred, unless shown to the contrary, that the grants were to be used only for such projects and not for anything else. Thus, even here, the respondent cannot use the grants in any other manner which it would choose to. Therefore, normally, such research grants by themselves cannot be considered as financing or funding the respondent even though the researches and the outcomes thereof might help enhance its prestige and add to its stature. However, research grants and similar funding are given to an institution after taking into consideration its infrastructure etc.; and if direct or indirect Government funding has had a bearing on the infrastructure, then the grants etc. may have to be considered together with the other direct or indirect Government fundings.
P. Last but not least, the Commission examined the tax exemptions availed by KIIT. The appellant has submitted that tax exemptions are another instance of indirect financing of the respondent society by the Government. This submission of the appellant was considered by THE Commission taking into account the annual reports for the 3 years which were submitted by the respondent society. These were examined to find out if KIIT could be said to have derived any great financial benefit in view of the income-tax exemptions availed by it. Before analyzing it, the Commission briefly discussed the rationale, import and effect of the relevant tax exemption provisions.
Under Sections 11 & 12 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, certain entities who are otherwise liable to pay tax on their income enjoy the benefit of exemption from payment of tax if they are registered by the Commissioner of Income-tax under Section 12A of the said Act and also if they comply with the conditions enumerated in Section 11 and do not commit any contravention of the nature specified in Section 13 of the said Act. These entities are: Public and Charitable Trusts, not being religious Trusts, registered under the Public Trust Acts; and, Societies and Associations / Institutions registered under the Societies‘ Registration Act, 1860. Registration under Section 12A of the Income-tax Act is the prime enabler of the exemption. The Commissioner of Income-tax allows registration after being satisfied that the entity is genuinely carrying on public and charitable activity. The conditions as per Section 11 are that the Trust or the Society or the Institution spends 85% of its surplus in a given year on public charitable activity; in case of any short-fall in application, it seeks the permission of the concerned Income-tax Authority to accumulate the unutilized surplus for a period not exceeding five years for utilization towards the ear-marked objects; it deposits the unutilized surplus amounts in specified categories such as deposits in scheduled banks etc. The contraventions listed out in Section 13 are: the benefits of the activities must ensure to the general public and not to any particular religion or caste; no undue benefit or advantage must accrue to the trustees, the managers or to persons who are substantially interested in the entity etc. If the entity is registered under Section 12A, complies with the conditions stipulated in Section 11 and does not commit any of the contraventions listed out in Section 13, its entire income becomes eligible for exemption from payment of Income-tax. Further, Section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961 provides that, amongst others, if a Trust or an Institution / Society registered under Section 12A is also separately approved by the Commissioner of Income-tax under Section 80G, then the contributors(of donations) to such entities shall have the benefit of deduction of 50% of such contributions from their income subjectible to tax. In certain situations, the deductions can be even 100%. Section 2(15) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which is the Section containing definitions, defines ―charitable purpose‖ as including ―relief of the poor‖, ―education‖, ―medical relief‖, advancement of any other object general public utility etc. As can be seen from the above, Sections 12 and 80G are land-mark socialwelfare-enabling provisions. The avowed objective is to promote specified activities known as public and charitable activities not only by foregoing tax on their income but also by foregoing a portion of the tax which the donors/contributors would have to otherwise pay. The State thus has made a great sacrifice to promote such activities, the foremost being education, medical relief and relief of the poor. The rationale behind foregoing tax on the income of the Trust, Society or Institution and on the income of the contributors is to enable the entities to utilize the funds spared from/exempt from taxation in the activities undertaken by them. Needless to say, this is a clear case of indirect funding. And since tax is public fund, it can more appropriately be called indirect public funding. Larger the spectrum of the activities and larger the income, larger would be the indirect funding. What is the income subjectible to tax which thus gets exempted from tax and enjoys the benefit of indirect public funding ? Generally, income subjectible to tax is the net income i.e. gross income deducted by expenditures. There are specified taxable entities called ‗Persons‘ recognised under the Indian Income-tax Act. They are: Individuals; Hindu Undivided Families; Companies; Firms; Bodies of Individuals or Associations of Persons; Local Authorities and Artificial Juridical Persons (Clause 31 of Section 2). Public Charitable Trusts and Associations come under the category of Bodies of Individuals or Association of persons. In the cases of the taxable entities, both income as well as expenditures are restricted to the revenue field. Receipts arising or accruing or becoming due on account of operations are ‗income‘. Expenditures incurred in the course of operations, referred to as ―in the course of business or profession‖, are the ‗deductible expenditures‘. But the Income-tax Act has narrowed the scope of income and has widened the scope of expenditures in the cases of the tax-free entities. Such narrowing and widening have been done through deeming provisions. In the case of Trusts, Societies, Associations and Institutions engaged in public and charitable activities, receipts in the nature of contributions to the corpus are not deemed to be Income. Thus the ‗taxable income‘ in their cases has a narrower domain. Further, expenditures in their cases include expenditures of a capital nature, say incurred on expansion etc., and thus 100% deductible, whereas in the cases of the other entities such expenses are not admissible in full. Only depreciation on account of wear and tear is allowed at specified percentages. So what gets exempted from tax in the cases of the tax-free entities is not the income as ordinarily understood in the common, commercial and professional parlance. The income which are not deemed as income and the special expenditures allowed specifically to them and not to the others get added to the tax-free basket. Thus the exemption from payment of tax in their cases is of substantial amounts. The State allows such exemption in the hope and with the objective that these entities cater to the general public needs and promote public activities.
Q. The annual accounts for the financial years 2013-14, 2014-15 and 2015-16 which were submitted by the respondent were examined. The examinations revealed the following salient features:
|
Sl. No. |
Nature of item |
F.Y. 2013-14 (In Rupees) |
F.Y.2014-15 (In Rupees) |
F.Y.2015-16 (In Rupees) |
|
1 |
Surplus for the year |
25,85,68,579/- |
36,76,45,077/- |
46,46,19,779/- |
|
2. |
Reserves and Surplus at the end of the year. |
349,84,34,268/- |
453,62,64,470/- |
569,66,51,308/- |
|
3. |
Development Fee shown in Reserves and Surplus |
46,31,11,390/- |
67,01,85,125/- |
69,57,67,059/- |
|
4. |
Long Term Borrowings |
467,04,37,731/- |
497,38,55,204/- |
541,96,58,415/- |
|
5 |
Tangible Assets |
723,49,58,310/- |
830,30,68,886/- |
840,07,82,141/- |
|
6 |
Capital Work in Progress |
12,01,72,850/- |
06,53,78,137/- |
92,68,87,152/- |
The Commission has analysed that in the above abstract, except for the surpluses of the given years, the remaining figures are year-end cumulative closing balances. It gives indications about the surpluses and the borrowings on the one hand and the tangible assets and works-in-progress on the other hand. The indications regarding the surpluses are that the same have been steadily increasing year after year. This is clear not only from the rise in the surpluses year on year but also from the increase in ‗reserves and surpluses.‘ These are nothing but the profits of the Society. The reserves and surpluses include the cumulative balance surpluses as per the Income and Expenditure statements as also the development fees. While the surpluses have been shown as ‗’direct income’ or as ‗’other income‘ in the Income and Expenditure statements, the development fees have been separately shown only in the Balance-Sheets. However, the development fees to the extent not refundable are also in the nature of income. Therefore, the surplus of each year, as reflected in the Income and Expenditure statements, will have to be increased by the development fees. If that is done, the tax-free surpluses would be higher than have been shown in the abstract. In this case, be it the surplus or the development fees, the same are not taxable in view of the exemption available to it under Section 12 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by virtue of the Society having been registered under Section 12A of the said Act. Thus, almost the entire reserves and surpluses at the end of any given year represent the cumulative amounts which have not suffered from tax. The indication one gets from the figures of long-term borrowings are that these have been growing year after year. The relevant schedules in respect of long-term borrowings have been perused. Term loans have been taken from several scheduled Banks such as the Allahabad Bank, Bank of India, Canara Bank, HDFC Bank, Oriental Bank of Commerce and the Punjab National Bank. All these are secured loans. The respondent Society has also taken over-draft (O.D) loans from some of these Banks. These are also secured by collaterals. It is mentioned in the ‗notes to the accounts of the relevant years that the securities given to the Banks, whether primary securities or collateral securities, are the land, buildings and equipment of the society. There are personal guarantees in a few cases as well. The respondent has also taken secured loans from certain private parties. Even these loans are secured by the land of the society. In other words, the respondent has availed huge loans from the scheduled Banks and others by mortgaging its land and buildings. Then the Commission analysed the tangible assets. The closing balance of the tangible assets at the end of a given year is more than the closing balance at the end of the preceding year. The same applies to capital work-in-progress as well. The above would clearly indicate that the respondent has been expanding steadily year after year. The increase is more than what would appear from the BalanceSheets because there have been increases even after claiming deductions on account of depreciation. Now if we make a still closer reading of the accounts, it would be clear that the expansion is financed largely by the surpluses and the long-term borrowings. This is evident from the Income and Expenditure statements as well as from the schedules to the ‗reserves and surplus accounts.‘ It also emerges from the analysis that the tax-exemption benefits enjoyed by the respondent have enabled it to go in for huge and steady expansion. Further, the land taken from the Government /IDCO on lease, some of which were mortgaged to the Banks helped the respondent society get substantial finances from the Banks. The Commission also looked into surpluses amount during the three years under consideration.The apparent surpluses would be more if the development fees are taken into consideration by including the same as income. Thus, but for the exemption provisions of Section 12 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the incomes / receipts for the above 3 years would have got taxed. In fact, the exempted income would be still higher. For example, KIIT made a donation of Rs.27,19,04,435/- to KISS during the financial year-ended 31.03.2014. Similarly, during the financial year-ended 31.03.2015, the respondent made a further donation of Rs.51,68,99,341/- to KISS. In the next year, i.e. year ended 31.03.2016, the donation to this entity was of the order of Rs.58,21,25,784/- . Under the other provisions of the Income-tax, 1961 (i.e. other than Sections 11, 12 & 13), the above donations would have been disallowed on the ground of not having been incurred in the course of business or profession. Alternately, assuming that KISS has been approved by the Commissioner of Income-tax under Section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the donor, i.e. the respondent, would have been entitled to only 50% of the donation amount as deduction from its total income of the relevant years. Either way, the taxable surpluses would have got further increased. In order to appreciate the financial benefit, which registration under Section 12A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 has ensured to the respondent, the above disallowable items will have to be necessarily reckoned.
R.The elaborate discussions made by the commission in this order clearly show that the respondent got large tracts of land, many of them contiguous, in the capital city of Bhubaneswar from the Government or its agencies at subsidized rates. It got such land over a period of several years. Parts of these land were earlier under encroachment by the respondent itself. Some parts were under encroachment by others and the respondent incurred expenses and made such parts of land encroachment-free. KIIT had also already built multi-storied buildings for class rooms, compound walls etc. on such land. After persistent efforts and fervent prayers made by authority of KIIT, some of these were later regularized in the respondent‘s favour. The respondent also used the forest land which under the OPLE Act are required to be distributed among the landless. The fact that the respondent had started using several patches of land even before the same were allotted would indicate its strong self-assurance that the same would be allotted. The further fact that some of these were also allotted is indicative of the benevolence of the State. If the Government had been of unkinder disposition, KIIT would not have had the advantage of such large tracts and contiguous plots/land for its campuses. Reference has been already made to the mutual transfers. It has been observed by the Commission that all the land involved in such mutual transfers, the leases of which were eventually transferred in favour of the respondent, were adjoining the respondent‘s existing campus. Had the lessor i.e. IDCO refused to make the transfers, KIIT’s campus expansion programme would have got adversely affected. Large tracts of contiguous land used to develop a large campus at one place has brought to be respondent tremendous operational advantages. Finances availed from the Banks by mortgaging the leasehold land have helped in the expansion of KIIT as an institution. The Commission has also noted that the tax exemptions availed by KIIT have helped it utilise its surplus for the setting up, expansion, development and growth of various institutions. In short, the largesse of the State as well as the tax exemptions have had crucial roles in the evolution and growth of the respondent and its several institutions. By any reckoning, the financial benefits availed by the respondent through allotment of Government land and availment of tax exemptions will have to be considered substantial. It has been observed that the respondent got the land from the Government and its agencies by making repeated efforts and through determined pursuit. The respondent had at each point of time pleaded before the Government and its agencies for help so that it could build up world class institutions. The contents of the respondent’s correspondences with the Government and its Agencies and the prayers for allotment and regularization of land would by themselves show how badly the respondent needed such land. There are also express admissions by the respondent itself that it would not be able to build the University on such a large scale and of such admirable class but for these land. The Commission has also referred to the litmus test laid down by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the Thalappalam case. The test to determine substantial financing is whether or not the non-Government organization could have established itself but for such financing and whether or not it would struggle to exist if such financing is withdrawn. It cannot be gain-said that KIIT could not have easily become what it is today – a highly admired University – but for the huge land at cheap rates which it got from the Government or its agencies. No doubt, it cannot be said that withdrawal of these land would make KIIT struggle to exist.
S. The Commission has also referred to the judgement of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the Thalappalam case wherein it was held that mere grants, subsidies, privileges and exemptions as such could not be treated as public financing. The words ―mere‖ and ―as such‖ are important. In the present case, KIIT not only got land from the Government and its agencies but also other grants and exemptions. Therefore, in the present case, the grants and exemptions including tax exemptions cannot be considered ‗mere.‘ On the contrary, all the above will have to be considered together. We have already referred to the decisions of the Hon‘ble Punjab and Haryana, Madras and Odisha High Courts in which significance was attached to ―the public function(s)‖ performed by an organization as well as to grants received from the Government, irrespective of quantum, as the test for deciding whether or not the organization could be treated as a public authority as per the definition provided in Section 2(h) of the RTI Act, 2005. There can be no dispute that KIIT is performing a public function. The Commission has made an elaborate discussion regarding the facts of the respondent‘s case in the light of the judgements of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the Thalappalam case and in the DAV College Trust case. It has clearly emerged from such discussion that the financing / funding received by the respondent Society KIIT from the Governments and their agencies have proved to KIIT to be of solid worth, considerable value, of real significance and of having significant material bearings and effects on the respondent‘s establishment growth and continuing existence as an acclaimed multi-disciplinary institution. But for such direct and indirect financing / funding, the respondent would have had to struggle, if such financing and fundings in the form of land on lease at concessional and subsidised rates of grants and of tax exemptions etc. are to be withdrawn.
Therefore, the Commission is of the considered view that the respondent, M/s KIIT, is a public authority within the meaning of Section 2(h)(d)(ii) of the RTI Act, 2005. In the light of the above, KIIT is declared as a public authority as per Section 2(h)(d)(ii) of the RTI Act, 2005; and is directed to furnish the required information to the appellant, as per his application in Form-A, within 30 days from the date of receipt of this order.
Analysis by
Pradip Pradhan
Appellant
M-9937843482
Email-pradippradhan63@gmail.com
Date- 18.9.21
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